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CHAPTER 12 
Civil Practice and Procedure 
DENNIS M. O'DEA* 
§12.1. Introduction. The Survey year saw a number of significant 
developments in the area of civil practice. Perhaps the most noteworthy of 
these was the introduction of the revised rules of civil procedure; how-
ever, since the new rules have been treated extensively elsewhere, 1 they 
will not be discussed here. This chapter will focus on acts of the General 
Court affecting the court costs of indigent persons, 2 service of process, 3 
and judicial review of agency practices and procedures by way of de-
claratory judgments. 4 
§12.2. Court costs of indigent persons. Chapter 694 of the Acts of 
1974 has amended chapter 261 of the General Laws by inserting new 
provisions for the payment of the court costs of indigent persons. This 
statute became effective on January 1, 197 5 and "shall apply to fees and 
costs incurred or becoming due on or after said date"1 in "any civil or 
criminal proceeding in the superior courts or in any probate, district, 
municipal, juvenile or housing court .... "2 
Chapter 694 identifies an indigent as "a person who is unable to pay the 
fees and costs of the proceeding in which he is involved, or is unable to do 
so without depriving himself or his dependents of the necessities of life, 
including food, shelter and clothing."3 In order to receive the benefits of 
*DENNIS M. O'DEA is an associate in the law firm of Fine & Ambrogne, Boston. 
§ 12.1. 1 See Symposium: The Massachusetts Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure, 
59 Mass. L.Q. 113 (1974). 
2 § 12.2 infra. 
3 § 12.3 infra. 
4 § 12.4 infra. 
§12.2. 1 Acts of 1974, c. 694, § 6. 
2 Id. § 3, adding G.L. c. 261, § 27B. 
3 Id., adding G.L. c. 261, § 27A. lndigency is determined by review of an affidavit of 
indigency filed with the court. 
Before making a finding of indigency, the court shall consider the following facts 
with respect to the applicant as of the time of hearing, in the immediate past and 
with respect to the immediate future: his age, education, training, physical and 
mental ability and number of dependents; gross and net income; regular and ex-
traordinary expenses, if any; assets and liabilities; whether or not he is a recipient 
1
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chapter 694, a person who is a party to a civil or criminal action must file 
an affidavit of indigency and request for waiver, substitution or county 
payment of fees and costs (the Request) with the clerk or register of the 
court involved in the proceedings. 4 
Although payment and the waiver of certain fees and costs for civil 
litigants proceeding in forma pauperis5 and of fees and costs incurred by 
criminal defendants, including attorney's fees, 6 are familiar practices, the 
language of chapter 694 will provide greater assistance to indigent liti-
gants in both criminal and civil proceedings and should lead to a uniform 
policy in the treatment of indigent litigants. The most striking aspect of 
chapter 694, however, lies in its treatment of the expenses of civil litiga-
tion commenced by a person who qualifies as an indigent. The Act does 
not merely relieve an indigent litigant of the costs imposed for filing and 
entry fees through a waiver of those fees, but provides for the "substitu-
tion or county payment of fees or costs."7 This language imposes an 
affirmative obligation on the county to pay certain fees and costs incurred 
by an indigent litigant. 
The definition of"fees and costs" will probably create serious interpre-
tive difficulties. "Fees and costs" is not well-defined under chapter 694, 
although the term is used extensively in the Act. In an attempt to establish 
the meaning of this term, chapter 694 provides that "fees and costs shall 
not include attorney's fees." 8 In defining the term negatively by excluding 
only attorney's fees from its purview, the Act leaves a wide range of other 
matters which may be identified as proper fees or costs set forth in a 
Request. 
The Act does attempt to clarify the meaning of "fees and costs" by 
dividing it into two components which are the subject of more precise, 
although no more enlightening, definitions. Fees and costs may be either 
(1) normal fees and costs or (2) extra fees and costs. "Normal fees and 
costs" are defined as "the fees and costs a party normally is required to pay 
in order to prosecute and defend the particular type of proceeding in 
which he is involved."9 "Extra fees and costs" are those "in addition to 
those a party is normally required to pay in order to prosecute or defend 
his case .... "10 The distinction is important since while "normal" fees and 
costs must be paid upon a finding of indigency, the payment of "extra" fees 
of public assistance and for what purpose; and any other facts which are relevant 
to the applicant's ability to pay court costs .... 
Acts of 1974, c. 694, § 3, adding G.L. c. 261, § 27C{I). 
• See note 3 supra. 
5 Prior to enactment of chapter 694, waiver of certain fees and costs of indigent civil 
litigants was provided for in G.L. c. 262, § 4. 
6 G.L. c. 221, § 34D (establishing the Massachusetts Defenders Committee). 
7 Acts of 1974, c. 694, § 3, adding G.L. c. 261, § 27B. 
8 Acts of 1974, c. 694, § 3, adding G.L. c. 261, § 27A. 
9 Id. 
'" Id. 
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and costs is, at least partly, discretionary with the court.U 
With the exception of attorneys' fees, which are specifically excluded 
from coverage by the Act, the use of the word "normal" to define a 
category of fees and costs raises more questions than it settles. The use of 
the word "required" may support an interpretation that normal fees and 
expenses encompass only those fees and expenses the payment of which is 
required by some governmental authority, such as filing fees and fees for 
service of process. The second sentence in the definition of "normal fees 
and costs" lends some support to this analysis by stating that such fees: 
shall include, but not be limited to, the following: in all civil cases, 
filing or entry fees and fees and related costs for service of process, 
including publication of a citation when publication is ordered; costs 
assessed in a bill of costs; in equity, fees for the issuance of an 
injunction, restraining order, writ or other process; in the probate 
court, fees for amendment of record. 12 
A court may infer from the types of fees and costs set forth in the Act that 
normal fees and costs do not include expenses which may ordinarily be 
incurred in the trial of certain actions which are not imposed by govern-
mental authorities, such as fees for expert witnesses, investigators, or 
consultants, or the costs of depositions and other discovery procedures. 
The fact that chapter 694 is codified under chapters 261 and 262 of the 
General Laws provides a basis for the contention that the scope of "fees 
and costs" should be limited to the fees and costs enumerated in those 
chapters. If the intent of the legislature was to limit fees and costs to those 
identified in these statutes, however, such intent should be more clearly 
expressed in order to prevent a broader interpretation. As the statute 
currently appears, a court is not necessarily limited by the type and 
amount of costs and fees identified in chapters 261 and 262. 
Since the determination of whether a particular fee or cost is "normal" 
or "extra" is extremely important in terms of the discretionary power of 
the court to order payment by the county, attorneys representing indi-
gent clients should seek a more expansive reading of the definition of 
normal fees and expenses. 
In a land damage action, a party is normally required to pay for an 
expert witness who must appraise the property in question. The use of 
experts is also a normal burden in medical malpractice cases and any 
other case in which expert opinion must be introduced as evidence for the 
plaintiff to prove his case. Stenographers' fees for oral depositions and 
costs incident to document discovery may also have become part of the 
11 Acts of 1974, c. 694, § 3, adding G.L. c. 261, § 27C(I). 
12 Id., adding G.L. c. 261, § 27A. It is unclear at this time whether a "fee for the is-
suance of an injunction" would include the cost of a bond ordered pursuant to Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 65(c) since there is no basis for determining whether the requirement of the 
posting of security constitutes a fee or cost within the meaning of the Act. 
3
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costs which "a party normally" is required to pay in order to defend or 
prosecute certain civil actions. 
The statute leaves the door open for the argument that the Act does not 
refer merely to those fees and costs imposed by the Commonwealth, its 
officers and agencies, and thus that the court must determine whether a 
particular fee or cost is one which a party is "normally ... required to pay 
in order to prosecute or defend the particular type of proceeding in which 
he is involved." 13 There is a sound statutory basis for an indigent's counsel 
to claim that a court must examine the nature of the proceeding and 
determine the fees and costs which a party would normally pay to prose-
cute or defend such a proceeding. If the action is of a type in which expert 
testimony is ordinarily required, such as medical malpractice, the costs 
and fees required to obtain such testimony and assistance would seem to 
qualify as the type of fees and costs "normally" incurred in such proceed-
ings. A similar argument would apply in products liability and other types 
of cases which require expert testimony. 
If expenses for expert advice and testimony are treated as normal fees 
and expenses, a major problem in the representation of indigents in 
medical malpractice actions would be substantially reduced. Although 
attorneys may represent their clients through a contingent fee arrange-
ment, the expenses incurred simply in prosecuting an action may be 
beyond the means of the indigent client. Although the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility allows an attorney to advance or guarantee the 
expenses of litigation if a client remains ultimately liable for such 
expenses, 14 indigent plaintiffs are seldom able to pay for the preparation 
of a case in areas such as malpractice, wrongful death or products liability, 
which may require substantial expenditures. It is questionable whether an 
attorney on a contingent fee basis may, consistently with Disciplinary Rule 
5-103,15 advance expenses for which he does not intend to hold the client 
liable and which the client is not able to pay. The ethical and financial 
difficulties which arise in representing indigent clients may be alleviated 
13 Acts of 1974, c. 694, § 3, adding G.L. c. 261, § 27A. Certain statutes which provide 
for the recovery of costs by the prevailing party explicitly recognize the essential nature 
of expenses other than the fees and costs imposed by the Commonwealth, its officers 
and agencies. E.g., G.L. c. 214, § 7A, added by Acts of 1973, c. 1114, § 62, which pro-
vides that in an action to prevent damage to the environment a court may award a pre-
vailing plaintiff costs "including reasonable fees of expert witnesses .... " 
14 ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 5-103(B). This problem would be 
avoided if such expenses were treated as "extra" fees and costs, which may be paid at 
the court's discretion. 
15 Id., which provides that: 
While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, 
a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to his client, except 
that a lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, including court 
costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examination, and costs of ob-
taining and presenting evidence, provided the client remains ultimately liable for 
such expenses. 
4
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in this respect by the Act. 
In addition to "normal fees and costs," the term "fees and costs" under 
the Act includes "extra fees and costs," which are defined as: 
[T]he fees and costs, in addition to those a party is normally re-
quired to pay in order to prosecute or defend his case, which result 
when a party employs or responds to a procedure not necessarily 
required in the particular type of proceeding in which he is involved. 
They shall include, but not be limited to, the following: fees and costs 
for the issuance or service of a subpoena, witnesses' fees, expert 
assistance and appeal bond premiums.16 
The specific references in this definition to subpoenas, witnesses' fees and 
expert assistance provide a clear indication that such expenses may be the 
subject of an indigent's request for waiver, substitution or county pay-
ment in a proceeding in which such expenses are not necessarily required. 
Their treatment here as examples of possible extra fees and costs, how-
ever, does not mean that such expenses may not be considered "normal" 
fees and costs in certain proceedings. The reference to such expenses in 
the definition of extra fees and costs does not necessarily indicate an 
attempt to eliminate or exclude these particular expenses from treatment 
as normal fees and costs. The critical language in the definition of "extra 
fees and costs" appears to be "not necessarily required." If "a subpoena, 
witnesses' fees, expert assistance and appeal bond premiums" are found 
by a judge to be in fact "necessarily required," they presumably could 
qualify as normal fees and costs. 
The language of the statute seems to permit either an expansive or a 
narrow reading of the definition of normal fees and costs. The fact that 
the definition refers to the "particular type of proceeding involved" 
indicates a functional approach which calls for an analysis of the nature of 
the action and the fees and costs which such actions normally require. A 
functional analysis would support an expansive reading of "normal fees 
and costs" to include the cost of expert assistance and discovery. On the 
other hand, the types of fees and costs specifically identified in the 
definitions themselves may be viewed as representative of the kinds of 
expenses which the General Court intended to arise under the two classes 
of fees and costs. By reading the types of fees and costs specified in the 
definition of "normal fees and costs" as language limiting the scope of the 
definition, a court could find the range of "normal" fees and costs to be 
limited to the statutory costs found in chapters 261 and 262 of the General 
Laws and any other cost imposed by law. This reading would view "extra 
fees and costs" as a term including all those fees and costs arising in a 
judicial proceeding which are in addition to those imposed by the laws of 
the Commonwealth, its officers or agencies. This latter, more narrow 
reading of the definitional provisions of the Act would be a distortion of 
18 Acts of 1974, c. 694, § 3, adding G.L. c. 261, § 27 A. 
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the language of the statute preceding the enumeration of specific fees and 
costs, however. The statute indicates an intent that the examples cited not 
be used to limit the matters which may fit within its definitions. The better 
analysis would be to give the language its inclusive intent and employ a 
functional approach under which each proceeding is examined individu-
ally to determine which fees and costs are "normal" or "extra."17 
The importance of determining whether a fee or cost is "normal" or 
"extra" becomes apparent from the standards of discretion a court may 
employ in passing on requests for fees and costs under the Act. The Act 
provides in part: 
If the court makes a finding of indigency, it shall not deny any request 
with respect to normal fees and costs, and it shall not deny 4ny request 
with respect to extra fees and costs if it finds the document, service or 
object is reasonably necessary to assure the applicant as effective a 
prosecution or defense as he would have if he were financially able to 
pay.ts 
The court must order payment of normal fees and costs if it finds that 
the party is an indigent person. In the case of extra fees and costs, 
however, the statute gives the court discretionary power. There is a 
standard for review of that discretion implied in the reference to the 
applicant being assured as effective a prosecution or defense as he might 
have if he were a non-indigent. A litigant may seek to overturn a denial of 
payment by making a showing that the denial places him at a substantial 
disadvantage in the litigation. Such a claim may include payment of 
deposition expenses and other essential discovery and trial preparation 
expenses. The court's discretion should thus be limited and guided by the 
remedial purpose of the statute. 
If a Request is denied by a court, chapter 694 provides for the filing of 
an appeal. 19 The court must give notice of the denial and advise the party 
of his right to appeal. The appeal must be filed with the proper clerk or 
register within seven days of the notice to the party of his right to appeal. 
When the notice of appeal is filed, the court which denied the Request is 
notified and the judge or justice must file his written findings and reasons 
for denial. 20 The court hearing the appeal is directed to set the matter 
down for speedy hearing. The trial court may stay proceedings pending 
the appeal, and the court hearing the appeal may also enter or revoke 
17 Such an inquiry would not be unduly burdensome since a court must always con-
duct a hearing prior to granting or denying a request for payment of extra fees and 
costs. Acts of 1974, c. 694, § 3, adding G.L. c. 261, § 27C(l). 
1s Id. 
18 If the action is before the district, municipal or juvenile court, appeal is to the 
superior court sitting in the same county. If the action is before the superior or probate 
court, appeal is to a single justice of the Appeals Court. Acts of 1974, c. 694, § 3, ad-
ding G.L. c. 261, § 27D. 
10 Acts of 1974, c. 694, § 3, adding G.L. c. 261, § 27C(1). 
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such a stay. 21 The statute provides that "the decision of the court hearing 
the appeal shall be final with respect to such a request."22 
A party whose fees and costs have been paid or waived pursuant to 
sections 27C and F of chapter 261 23 is obligated to repay the amount so 
paid or waived if he recovers as a result of such proceedings an amount in 
excess of three times the total amount of such fees and costs. 24 The statute 
also provides for a procedure under which the court must notify all 
parties of the total amount of fees and costs and the manner in which 
parties obligated to pay any judgment or settlement in excess of three 
times the total amount of such fees and costs shall tender payment. 25 
21 Acts of 1974, c. 694, § 3, adding G.L. c. 261, § 27D. 
22 Id. This language should be read only as an indication that a denial or order of 
payment by the trial judge is merely interlocutory and does not become "final" until af-
firmed or reversed by the court having appellate jurisdiction under G.L. c. 261, § 27D. 
It should not be read as an attempt to oust the full Appeals Court or the Supreme 
Judicial Court of all appellate jurisdiction over matters arising under the Act. Since the 
Supreme Judicial Court has general appellate jurisdiction and superintendence power 
over all inferior courts, G.L. c. 211, § 3, as amended by Acts of 1973, c. 1114, § 44, 
such an ouster of jurisdiction should be made only in explicit terms. 
That such review be available is critical in light of the vagueness with which the Act 
defines "fees and costs." An elaboration by the Supreme Judicial Court of what fees 
and costs are "normal" or "extra" is desirable, particularly since the trial court judge has 
a certain amount of discretion with regard to a grant or denial of a Request for "extra" 
fees and costs. A definitive determination of what fees and costs may be treated with 
discretion and what the bounds of that discretion are will go a long way toward effec-
tuating the purpose of the Act, i.e., to guarantee an indigent "as effective a prosecution 
or defense as he would have if he were financially able to pay" the costs of litigation 
himself. Acts of 1974, c. 694, § 3, adding G.L. c. 261, § 27C(I). If this interpretation is 
correct, a "final" decision rendered under the provisions of G.L. c. 261, § 27D, could be 
reviewed by the full Appeals Court pursuant to G.L. c. 211A, § 10, with' further review 
by the Supreme Judicial Court under G.L. c. 211 A, § II. 
23 Section 27F allows a court to order that "the document, service or object for which 
a normal or extra fee or cost would be charged shall be provided by an alternative 
means at lower or no cost, if the substitute thereby provided is substantially equivalent 
.... "Acts of 1974, c. 694, § 3, adding G.L. c. 261, § 27F. 
24 Acts of 1974, c. 694, § 3, adding G.L. c. 261, § 27E. The recoupment provisions of 
chapter 694 do not contain the infirmities which led the United States Supreme Court 
to declare unconstitutional a Kansas recoupment statute whereby the state could re-
cover in subsequent civil proceedings counsel and other legal defense fees expended for 
the benefit of indigent defendants. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972). The statute 
was held to violate the Equal Protection Clause in that it deprived indigents of the array 
of protective exemptions Kansas provided for other civil judgment debtors, such as re-
strictions on the amount of disposable earnings subject to garnishment. The Court, cit-
ing Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308-09 (1966), held that "the Equal Protection 
Clause 'imposes a requirement of some rationality in the nature of the class singled out.' 
This requirement is lacking where, as in the instant case, the State has subjected indi-
gent defendants to such discriminatory conditions of repayment.'' 407 U.S. at 140. 
Although the Court did not reach the question, it indicated that recoupment statutes 
as such are not violative of constitutional principles. Id. at 133-34. 
25 If a party is obligated to pay a judgment or settlement exceeding three times the 
total amount of fees and costs paid or waived on behalf of the opposing party under 
G.L. c. 261, §§ 27C, 27F, he must pay to the clerk or register the total amount of such 
7
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Chapter 694 may become a fruitful area for creative counsel to obtain 
county payment of many of the costs which attend the trial and prepara-
tion of civil and criminal matters. It may become a useful device in the 
prosecution of public interest cases involving class actions or other cases 
involving sophisticated discovery and costly trial preparation if a court is 
convinced that such expenses are necessary. The extent to which courts 
will exercise their discretion in allowing payment, waiver or substitution 
of fees and costs is difficult to determine at this time. It will depend to a 
great degree upon the willingness of the trial courts to read chapter 694 
with an appreciation of its remedial intent. 
§12.3. Service of process. Service of process commencing a civil 
action may be accomplished in a variety of ways. 1 Massachusetts statutes 
and rules of court generally require service to be made by an officer 
authorized by statute2 or a person authorized by order of court.3 While 
personal service upon a defendant provides the greatest assurance that he 
has been properly called to appear and answer in a civil action, Mas-
sachusetts law also authorizes service to be made at a defendant's last and 
usual place of abode. 4 The inherent danger that such service may not be 
received by a defendant prompted the General Court to enact chapter 
fees or costs or his proportionate share of such amount and deduct that amount from 
the judgment or settlement. The clerk or register is directed to send a notice to all par-
ties when the costs and fees have been reimbursed. Upon receipt of such notice or, if 
no notice has been received, within thirty days of a party's payment of his share of the 
costs and fees, the party is directed to "promptly forward ~he remainder of the judg-
ment or settlement to the party entitled to it." Acts of 1974, c. 694, § 3, adding G.L. c. 
261, § 27E. This payment provision may become a source of some anxiety to defen-
dants who prefer to await the issuance of an execution, supplementary process or other 
proceeding before they pay their debts. It is not clear from § 27E whether its provisions 
may be enforced through the court's contempt power. Since the statute does not re-
quire payment of the judgment or settlement at any specific time, payment should not 
be ordered by the court. The prevailing party must follow the normal process of obtain-
ing an execution and pursuing other post-judgment remedies if the party against whom 
the judgment is entered fails to make payment voluntarily. The matter is not without 
doubt though since the county has an interest in that portion of the judgment or set-
tlement which will be applied to the costs and fees ordered paid or waived by the court. 
In a case in which a substantial amount of county funds are involved, the county or the 
Commonwealth may seek an order from the court directing payment. There is no pro-
vision in the statute addressing the interest of the county in receiving reimbursement as 
provided under § 27E. Whether a court may allow the county to intervene or obtain an 
execution and seek to collect the amount due under § 27E is an open question. 
§12.3. 1 See, e.g., G.L. c. 22)J, §§ 26-40; Mass. R. Civ. P. 4. For a convenient table list-
ing the various modes of service of the summons and complaint applicable to various 
classes of defendants, see J. Smith & H. Zobel, 6 Mass. Practice, Rules Practice, § 4.8, at 
77 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Smith & Zobel]. 
2 G.L. c. 37, § ll (sheriffs); G.L. c. 41, § 92 (constables); G.L. c. 220, § 7 (process 
servers). 
3 Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(c). 
4 G.L. c. 223, § 31; Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d). 
8
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748 of Acts of 1974,5 which provides: 
If service is made at the last and usual place of abode, the officer 
making service shall forthwith mail first class a copy of the summons 
to such last and usual place of abode. The date of mailing and the 
address to which the summons was sent shall be set forth as required 
by section thirty-five [of chapter 223] in the officer's return. 6 
Chapter 748 is limited in its application to service of process in actions 
commenced in district courts. 7 The reason for so limiting the requirement 
is not readily apparent. Although the times within which answers must be 
filed are different in the district court and in the superior court and in 
other courts governed by other rules of procedure, 8 the greater assurance 
of effective service provided by first class mailing under chapter 748 
would seem to be of the same value in any case in which service is made at a 
defendant's last and usual place of abode. As the new rules of civil 
procedure are monitored and reviewed, it will perhaps become apparent 
that the first class mailing requirement which now applies only in the 
district courts should be extended to all proceedings initiated in the 
Commonwealth. 9 
The use of the mails to effect the initial service of process to commence 
a civil action is authorized both by rule of court and statute in a number of 
instances.1° Chapter 223A of the General Laws, the Massachusetts "long 
5 Acts of 1974, c. 748, amending G.L. c. 223, § 31. 
6 Id. 
7 G.L. c. 223, § 31, as amended by Acts of 1973, c. ll4, § 90, is concerned only with 
service of process with respect to actions brought in district court. 
8 The time limit for filing a responsive pleading under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(a) is 20 
days, unless otherwise directed by the court. The Rules govern proceedings in superior 
court, Boston housing court, and the housing court of the County of Hamden, in 
equitable actions in probate court, in certain actions in the land court, and in actions 
before a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court or of the Appeals Court. Mass. R. 
Civ. P. I. In actions brought in a district court, a responsive pleading must be filed on 
the Thursday after the return day of the writ, notice, or other process by which the de-
fendant or his property is brought before the court to answer. Mass. Dist. Ct. R.13. 
9 A committee chaired by Hon. Alvin C. Tarnkin, Justice of the Hingham District 
Court, drafted a proposed set of rules to govern civil procedure in the district courts 
and Boston Municipal Court. "The guiding principle of the proposed ... draft is the 
... adoption ... of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure with only those modifi-
cations required by jurisdictional or significant practical reasons." Mass. Lawyers 
Weekly, Nov. 18, 1974, at 105. The final draft of the Tarnkin Committee rules recom-
mends that Mass. R. Civ. P. 4, which indicates the various ways in which process may be 
served, be adopted without change. This recommendation overlooks the requirement, 
for actions brought in district court, of first class mailing for service made at a 
defendant's last and usual place of abode imposed by Acts of 1974, c. 748, a require-
ment that is not presently contained in Rule 4. Presumably the Tarnkin draft will be 
revised to conform with this new statutory requirement. 
10 See, e.g., G.L. c. 223, § 38 (service on foreign corporations); G.L. c. 223A, § 6 (ser-
vice on person not a citizen or domiciliary of the Commonwealth). See Smith & Zobel, 
supra note 1, § 4.8, at 77. 
9
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arm statute," permits service of process upon an out of state defendant by 
any form of mail that requires a signed receipt. 11 Certified mail is the most 
common form of service employed for this purpose. At least one case 
involving a challenge to the validity of service of process under chapter 
223A indirectly indicates that such service need not be made by an officer 
authorized by statute or a person authorized by order of court but may be 
made by plaintiff's attorney, as long as he files an affidavit setting forth his 
compliance with the formal requirements of the long arm statute. 12 Ap-
parently, no litigant ha~ called the court's attention to the fact that there is 
no authority, in rule or statute, for service by a party's attorney or any 
other person who is not specifically authorized by law or court order to 
serve process. 13 
11 G.L. c. 223A, § 6(a). 
12 Kagan v. United Vacuum Appliance Corp., 357 Mass. 680, 260 N.E.2d 208 (1970), 
discussed in Curtin and Young, Civil Procedure and Practice, 1970 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law § 28.1, at 687-92. In Kagan the Court held that service upon the defendant corpo-
ration under G.L. 223A was invalid due to the failure of the plaintiff to direct the regis-
tered mail envelope containing the process to one of the individuals specified in G.L. c. 
223, § 37 (service upon a domestic corporation authorized to be made on the 
corporation's president, treasurer, clerk, cashier, secretary, agent, or other officer in 
charge of its business). 357 Mass. at 685, 260 N.E.2d at 2ll. The Court held that under 
G.L. c. 223A, § 8, if a law of the Commonwealth requires service outside the Common-
wealth to be made upon a designated individual, service must be made on the desig-
nated individual to be valid. Id. The authority for service upon a foreign corporation is 
found in G.L. c. 223, § 38, which authorizes service in the same manner as service upon 
domestic corporations under G.L. c. 223, § 37. Since G.L. c. 223, § 37 requires service 
to be made upon certain specified individuals, the mailing of the process in Kagan to 
the defendant corporation addressed to "United Vacuum Appliance Corp." was insuffi-
cient and invalid. This technical requirement escaped the pl"aintiff's attorney in Kagan. 
Careful counsel who are aware of the Kagan holding may prefer to assure competent 
service by closely supervising the person making service. 
Smith and Zobel specifically treat service by a plaintiff's attorney by registered or cer-
tified mail as a proper form of service under G.L. c. 223A, § 6 and Mass. R. Civ. P. 4. 
Smith & Zobel, supra note I,§ 4.26, at 87-88. But see note 14 infra. 
13 Under the terms of G.L. c. 223A, § 7: 
Service outside this commonwealth may be made by an individual permitted to 
make service of process under the law of this commonwealth or under the law of 
the place in which the service is made or who is designated by a court of this 
commonwealth. 
The individuals who may make service of original civil process under Massachusetts law 
are sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, special sheriffs and constables. A plaintiff's attorney or any 
other person who is not directly employed to serve civil process by rule or statute must 
be designated by court order under Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(c) if he is to make valid service of 
process, whether that process is served personally or by certified or registered mail 
under G.L. c. 223A, § 6. In the district and municipal courts, the present rules do not 
specifically provide for the designation of an individual who is not an officer such as a 
sheriff or constable to serve process, although the court would have the authority to 
designate a person to serve process. 
Improper service of process, however, is a defect which may be overlooked and 
waived by a defendant. Under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12, an objection to the validity of service 
is waived if it is not set forth in a responsive pleading or joined in any motion made 
under Rule 12. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (g), (h). 
10
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In a case in which service of process may be made by registered or 
certified mail, there appears to be no substantial reason for the require-
ment that service be made by an officer or someone designated by the 
court upon the motion of the plaintiff. The delivery of the letter contain-
ing the process to be served is assured by the notation on the return 
receipt made by the addressee or the addressee's agent. The actual deliv-
ery of the process is made by an employee of the postal service who is 
usually disinterested in the proceedings. The only aspect of this form of 
service which would support a limitation to officers and persons desig-
nated by court order is that the person making service must attest to the 
fact that the process to be served was actually placed within the envelope 
mailed by certified or registered mail. Although such a dispute regarding 
the sufficiency of service is an unlikely occurrence, it remains a possible 
ground for requiring court authorization for service by someone other 
than an officer authorized by rule or statute to serve process. 14 This 
14 See Smith & Zobel, supra note 1, § 4.26, at 87-88. The fact that there may be need 
for verification of service by the person mailing the process indicates that it would be 
advisable for service to be made by someone other than the plaintiffs attorney. Smith 
and Zobel recommend this precaution when seeking designation or appointment of a 
person to make service under Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(c): 
In special situations, especially if immediate service is essential, plaintiff may move 
ex parte for an order appointing any individual (except, presumably, himself, his 
attorney or a person related to or closely associated with either) to serve the sum-
mons and complaint. 
Smith & Zobel, supra note I,§ 4.6, at 76. 
It is unfortunate that the commentators imply that Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(c) provides for 
designation in special circumstances only. The author has observed a similar reluctance 
on the part of trial justices in specially designating constables or other individuals under 
Rule 4(c). There is nothing in the Rule to limit to special situations the appointment or 
designation of persons to serve process. The Rule states that persons may be "specially 
appointed" by the court to make service of process. Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(c). 
If service is to be made outside the Commonwealth, a person "designated by a court 
of the commonwealth" may make service. A court may infer an intent to limit the ap-
plication of Rule 4(c) to special circumstances from the fact that the federal rule from 
which it is derived contained a direction, not present in the Massachusetts rule, that 
special appointments were to be made freely in certain circumstances. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
4(c), which provides: 
Service of all process shall be made by a United States Marshal, by his deputy, or 
by some person specially appointed by the court for that purpose, except that a 
subpoena may be served as provided in Rule 45. Special appointments to serve 
process shall be made freely when substantial savings in travel fees will result. 
A court should not, however, treat the exclusion of the last sentence of Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 4(c) from the corresponding Massachusetts rule as an indication that appointments 
and designations should not be made freely. There is nothing in the Reporter's Notes 
to Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(c) which would indicate the need for a restrictive use of Rule 4(c). 
If the courts freely exercise their discretion to allow appointment and designation of 
persons to serve process, they will be promoting much greater efficiency and may indi-
rectly improve the operations of the offices of the various deputy sheriffs. 
There is no guidance in Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(c) regarding the precise qualifications of 
the person who may be appointed or designated to serve process. In discussing the fed-
11
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problem may be com pounded if the validity of service under the long arm 
statute is attested to by a plaintiff's attorney. Under Rule 4(£) of the 
Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, when service is made by a person 
other than a sheriff, special sheriff or deputy sheriff, or if service is made 
outside Massachusetts, the person making the service must execute and 
file with the court an affidavit of service. As both a practical and an ethical 
matter, attorneys should not place themselves in a position in which their 
testimony may be required to prove proper service of process. In order to 
avoid disputes which may require an attorney's testimony or challenge his 
affidavit, service should not be made by a plaintiff's attorney.in any case. 
Although there does not appear to be any authority in rule or statute 
for service by anyone other than an officer or specially designated person, 
it is presently a common practice for long arm service to be effected 
without complying with the statutory formalities. The advantage to a 
litigant in mailing process directly to a defendant by certified or regis-
tered mail lies in the ability of the plaintiff's counsel to assure im-
mediate and proper service. Service under chapter 223A has certain 
technical requirements which may be overlooked by an officer making 
service unless he is closely supervised. 15 
A problem similar to that arising under the long arm statute also exists 
in connection with service by certified or registered mail upon the Com-
monwealth or one of its political subdivisions or agencies. 16 Process may 
eral rule, Wright and Miller have noted: 
One court adopted the qualifications set forth in Rule 45(c) for service of a sub-
poena and stated that any suitable person over 18 years of age who was not a 
party would be appointed to serve process but refused to appoint the attorney of a 
party, on the ground that he stands in the same relationship to the case as does a 
party. The use of the subpoena analogy seems sound inasmuch as it insures a dis-
interested and mature process server. 
4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil§ 1091, at 352 (1969). 
The Massachusetts rule for service of a subpoena, Mass. R. Civ. P. 45(c), is similar to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c): "A subpoena may be served by any person who is not a party and 
is not less than 18 years of age .... " The Reporter's Notes to Mass. R. Civ. P. 45(c) also 
caution against service by the attorney for a party to the action. Both statute and rule 
thus permit service by a party's attorney. Although permissible, this practice may be 
unwise. See ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 5-102: EC 5-9, 5-lO: ABA 
Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 19. 
15 See note 12 supra. 
'
6 Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d) provides that service of process can be made: 
(3) Upon the Commonwealth or any agency thereof by delivering a copy of the 
summons and of the complaint to the office of the Attorney General of the Com-
monwealth; or by mailing such copies by registered or certified mail to the Attor-
ney General of the Commo~wealth. 
(4) Upon a county, city, town or other political subdivision of the Common-
wealth subject to suit, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint 
to the treasurer or the clerk thereof; or by leaving such copies at the office of the 
treasurer or the clerk thereof with the person then in charge thereof; or by mail-
ing such copies to the treasurer or the clerk thereof by registered or certified mail. 
(5) Upon an authority, board, committee, or similar entity, subject to suit under 
a common name, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the 
12
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be served upon the Commonwealth by certified or registered mail, but 
there is no provision specifically authorizing service by anyone other than 
a person authorized under Rule 4(c).H 
In cases in which service may be made by certified or registered mail, 
the persons who may make service should not be limited to those persons 
identified in Rule 4(c) or authorized by statute. The Rules of Civil Proce-
dure should be amended to allow such service to be made in the same 
manner as service of a subpoena under Rule 45(c). Such a clarifying 
amendment to Rule 4(c) would bring the rules into conformity with 
current practice and authorize a more efficient form of service. Until such 
an amendment is made, service should be made in strict compliance with 
the rules and statutes as they now appear. Although there is the possibility 
that a court may interpret the rules and the statutes in such a manner that 
long arm service may be made by a person who is not explicitly authorized 
by Rule 4(c), few attorneys would benefit their clients by seeking to resolve 
this collateral issue when it may easily be avoided by seeking designation 
of a person to serve process or employing a deputy sheriff or constable. 
§ 12.4. Review of agency practices and procedures by declaratory 
judgment. Chapter 231A of the General Laws empowers the Supreme 
Judicial Court, superior court, land court, and probate courts to "make 
binding declarations of right, duty, status and other legal relations ... 
either before or after a breach or violation thereof has occurred in any 
case in which an actual controversy has arisen and is specifically set forth 
in the pleadings .... "1 In determining the scope of application of chapter 
231A to specific controversies and disputes, the courts have on several 
occasions indicated that actions brought for declaratory judgment are 
premature where there exist administrative procedures available to the 
complaining party which should have been followed and exhausted prior 
to appealing to the court's powers under chapter 231A. 2 The Supreme 
Judicial Court has recently provided additional guidance for determining 
whether the declaratory judgment procedure is available in a case in 
which there are other statu tory and regulatory avenues for appeal avail-
able to a party to an administrative proceeding. As the discussion which 
follows will indicate, the interplay between the jurisdiction of the courts 
under chapter 231A and the obligation upon parties to follow administra-
tive procedures prior to seeking judicial intervention has not been finally 
chairman or other chief executive officer; or by leaving such copies at the office of 
the said entity with the person then in charge thereof; or by mailing such copies to 
such officer by registered or certified mail. 
17 The Attorney General's office has challenged a failure to comply with Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 4(c) as a defect in service in at least one action with which the author is familiar. 
League School of Boston v. Anrig, Civil No. 1275 (Suffolk Super. Ct., Aug. 19, 1974). 
§ 12.4. I G.L. c. 231 A, § 1. 
• See, e.g., Batista v. Nicolls, 213 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1954); Gordon v. Hardware Mut. 
Cas. Co., 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 757,281 N.E.2d 573. 
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settled or determined by the Supreme Judicial Court. Recent statutory 
amendments, however, have exhibited a policy of permitting recourse to 
the courts prior to the exhaustion of available administrative remedies. 
In East Chop Tennis Club v. Massachusetts Commission Against Dis-
crimination, 3 a tennis club and three of its officers commenced an action 
for declaratory judgment against the Massachusetts Commission Against 
Discrimination (MCAD) seeking a decree that the club was not a place of 
public accommodation within the reach of the anti-discrimination law4 
enforced by the MCAD. The superior court entered a decree declaring 
that the club was a private facility and ordered the MCAD to desist from 
further proceedings. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the 
filing of a bill for declaratory relief did not operate to suspend ordinary 
requirements that the plaintiff exhaust its administrative remedies before 
seeking judicial relief and that the action commenced by the club under 
chapter 231A was premature. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the 
trial court's decision on that issue and remanded the case for further 
proceedings. 
In reviewing the Commission's demurrer, which put in issue the juris-
diction of the courts to entertain the club's suit while proceedings against 
the club were pending before the Commission, the Court examined the 
statutory provisions governing the operations of the MCAD. 5 It found 
that the "Legislature has established a comprehensive scheme of adminis-
trative procedures and remedies which persons appearing before the 
commission must follow before seeking relief from the Superior Court."6 
The Court went on to note that the action had been commenced at a 
preliminary stage in the proceedings at which the investigating commis-
sioner had found probable cause to credit the complaint against the club 
and had set terms of conciliation. The full commission had not yet held a 
hearing on the com plaint or issued any cease and desist orders against the 
club. In the Court's view, "Clearly the club failed to exhaust its administra-
tive remedies under the statutory provisions outlined above before it 
brought the bill in the Superior Court. The question then becomes 
whether such failure is fatal to the club's suit for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief." 7 
The Court referred to its opinion in Gordon v. Hardware Mutual 
Casualty Co., 8 in which it set forth a rule that "in the absence of a 
statutory directive to the contrary, the administrative remedies should 
be exhausted before resort to the courts."9 The club argued that ac-
3 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1611,305 N.E.2d 507. 
4 G.L. c. 272, § 92A. 
5 MCAD is established under G.L. c. 6, § 56, and its functions and duties are set forth 
in G.L. c. 1518, §§ 2, 3, 5, 6. 
8 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1615, 305 N.E.2d at 510. 
7 ld. 
8 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 757, 281 N.E.2d 573. 
9 ld. at 762, 281 N.E.2d at 577. 
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tions under chapter 2 31 A constituted an exception to the general re-
quirement of exhaustion set forth in Gordon and cited as authority the 
Court's holding in Meenes v. Goldberg, 10 where the court granted de-
claratory relief to a group of plaintiffs who sought a decree with re-
spect to the validity of a lien for sewer assessments. Although the 
plaintiffs there had not followed the statutory remedies of abatement 
and payment of the tax under protest, the Court found that, "Com-
monly relief under [G.L. c. 231A] should not be denied because of 
the possibility of some other form of remedy, if the case presented 
comes within the general scope of the chapter and no special reasons 
exist against the use of the declaratory process."11 The Court in East 
Chop noted that the Meenes rule had been followed in a long series of 
cases involving "tax challenges,"12 but that its application generally 
had not been "extended . . . to reach other types of cases involving 
different administrative agencies and procedures, although there are 
exceptions."13 The Court further stated that "even within the context 
of the tax cases themselves we have often emphasized that the ordi-
nary requirement of exhaustion will be suspended only when the facts 
of a particular case raise important public questions whose resolution 
concerns or will affect more persons than the parties to the case .... 
In the present case no such issue of general public concern has been 
raised."14 
The Court also found that there were " 'special reasons' to deny the 
use of the declaratory practice in this case."15 Since the legislature had 
granted the MCAD broad powers to investigate and act on complaints 
of discrimination, the Court felt that it should not short-circuit this 
legislative scheme by allowing a court to adjudicate issues which lie 
within the MCAD's designated field before the Commission has itself 
had an opportunity to rule on them. 16 
The Court set forth in clear language its view that declaratory 
judgment procedures should not be followed in a case in which ad-
ministrative remedies had not been exhausted: 
A proceeding for declaratory relief in itself does not operate to 
suspend the ordinary requirement that a plaintiff exhaust his ad-
ministrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. While c. 231 A 
10 331 Mass. 688, 122 N.E.2d 356 (1954). 
11 Id. at 691, 122 N.E.2d at 359. 
12 See cases cited in 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1616, 305 N.E.2d at 511. 
1a Id. One exception noted by the Court is City of New Bedford v. New Bedford, 
Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. Auth., 329 Mass. 243, 107 N.E.2d 
513(1952). 
14 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1617, 305 N.E.2d at 511-12. Accord, Massachusetts Mut. 
Life Ins. v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 863, 296 
N.E.2d 805. 
15 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1617,305 N.E.2d at 512. 
16 Id. 
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was intended as remedial legislation, giving a party a new and ad-
ditional procedure for resolving controversies, ... there is no in-
dication that it was intended as an automatic substitution for ad-
ministrative proceedings. 17 
The Court also rejected the club's argument that there was no re-
quirement that it exhaust administrative remedies since the MCAD 
was without jurisdiction over the club. The Court would not allow the 
jurisdiction of the MCAD to be attacked collaterally by way of a de-
claratory judgment proceeding, and distinguished St. Luke's Hospital v. 
Labor Relations Commission, 18 which held that: 
Where an administrative board is created by or is acting under a 
statute that is violative of the Federal or a State Constitution, or 
where the board is dealing with a matter that is clearly beyond its 
scope of authority, then one may challenge the jurisdiction of the 
board by invoking the aid of the courts and need not wait until 
the board has made a final order. 19 
The Court noted that the St. Luke's Hospital case was considered on 
the pleadings, whereas the case then before it was such that the Court 
could not determine from the face of the bill and appendices, as a 
matter of law, that the plaintiff club was a private facility. The Court 
thus held that "The commission must be permitted to make its own 
findings of fact essential to its determination of jurisdiction. In ordi-
nary circumstances, '[ w ]here the contention is that ... [a] board is act-
ing beyond its jurisdiction, the board should have an opportunity to 
ascertain the facts and decide the question for itself ... .' "20 The 
Court then determined that in the case of the East Chop Tennis Club, 
the Commission's initial jurisdictional findings may be reviewed only if 
and when the Commission issues a cease and desist order against the 
club. Thus, East Chop contains a very clear statement by the Court that 
it will not permit a party to circumvent the administrative procedure 
set forth in the legislation empowering the MCAD to investigate dis-
crimination through the filing of a declaratory judgment action.21 
Professor Davis, in his essay on "discretionary justice,"22 describes 
discretionary action as "the lifeblood of the administrative process."23 
17 Id. at 1617-18, 305 N.E.2d at 512. 
18 320 Mass. 467, 70 N.E.2d 10 (1946). 
19 Id. at 470, 70 N.E.2d at 12. 
20 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1619, 305 N.E.2d at 513, quoting St. Luke's Hospital, 320 
Mass. at 470, 70 N.E.2d at 12. 
21 In Jacoby v. Babcock Artificial Kidney Center, Inc., 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 97, 307 
N.E.2d 2, the Court held that the underlying principle of East Chop, viz., that the exis-
tence of a dispute is, of itself, insufficient reason to disrupt the ordinary administrative 
process, applies a fortiori to pending court proceedings. 
22 K. Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (1969). 
23 ld. at 21. 
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Discretionary action includes, of course, both formal and informal ad-
judication of disputes. But few questions for discretionary justice, 
Davis asserts, ever reach the stage of adjudication. 24 The bulk of dis-
cretionary justice, he suggests, is comprised of "initiating, investiga-
ting, prosecuting, negotiating, settling, contracting, dealing, advising, 
threatening, publicizing, concealing, planning, recommending, super-
vising. Often the most important discretionary decisions are the nega-
tive ones, such as not to initiate, not to prosecute, [etc.]."25 
Discretionary action of the sort described by Professor Davis usually 
goes unreviewed unless it is raised as a collateral issue in an attack on 
a "final decision" of an adjudicatory process. As long as discretion is 
exercised even-handedly, the lack of any formalized check of it poses 
no problem. However, situations calling for discretionary action are 
often complicated by pressures, personalities and politics, and the 
presence of these factors will not only undercut the best-intentioned 
efforts at even-handedness, but will also come to be reflected in the 
customary and usual method of conducting official business. 
The General Court in the 1974 Survey year created an efficient ju-
dicial remedy for persons aggrieved by official abuse of discretionary 
powers. Chapter 630 of the Acts of 1974, amending chapter 231A of 
the General Laws, allows an aggrieved person to file an action seeking 
a declaratory judgment: 
to obtain a determination of the legality of the administrative 
practices and procedures of any municipal, county or state agency 
or official which practices or procedures are alleged to be in viola-
tion of the Constitution of the United States or of the constitution 
or laws of the commonwealth, or are in violation of rules or regu-
lations promulgated under the authority of such laws, which viola-
tion has been consistently repeated; provided, however, that this 
section shall not apply to the governor and council or the legisla-
tive and judicial departments. For the purpose of this section 
practices or procedures mean the customary and usual method of 
conducting municipal, county, state agency or official business. 26 
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies will not bar the bringing of 
an action under chapter 630 as long as the petition for declaratory re-
lief is accompanied by an affidavit stating that the practice or proce-
dure complained of is known to exist by the agency and that reliance 
on administrative relief would be futile. 27 
The relief available under chapter 630 is distinguishable from the 
24 ld. at 22. 
25 Id. 
26 Acts of 1974, c. 630, §I, amending G.L. c. 23IA, § 2. 
27 Acts of 1974, c. 630, § 2, amending G.L. c. 231A, § 3. 
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declaratory relief available under section 7 of chapter 30A of the 
General Laws, the Massachusetts Administrative Procedure Act, the 
purpose of which is to provide judicial review of formally promul-
gated "regulations" as these are defined by section 5 of chapter 30A. 
Excluded from the statutory definition, and therefore from judicial 
review by way of a declaratory judgment under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, are regulations controlling, inter alia, operations of 
state penal, educational, health and welfare institutions; the develop-
ment and management of property held in the name of an agency or 
the Commonwealth; and an agency's internal management and its re-
lations with other agencies. 28 
Chapter 630 contains no such exclusionary language. It appears, 
therefore, that regulations for which direct review by declaratory 
judgment is not provided in chapter 30A nevertheless may be indi-
rectly reviewed if a question of their validity underlies a challenge to 
the "customary and usual method" of conducting agency business. 
z• G.L. c. 30A, § I (5). 
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